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OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL DEED
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT 1, Nancy Janet McKinstry Whiteside, as Trustee o f the Nancy Whiteside Trust dated
April 20, 1998, hereinafter called GRANTOR, for and in consideration o f the sum of TEN
DOLLARS ($10.00) and other good, valuable and sufficient consideration, in hand paid by
Whiteside Investment Company, LLC, hereinafter called GRANTEE, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, the GRANTOR does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said
GRANTEE one-half (1/2) of GRANTOR'S undivided interest in and to all of the oil, gas, distillate
and other minerals, o f whatsoever kind or nature, in and under and that may be produced from the
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MINERAL INTEREST
IMPLIED EASEMENT OF SURFACE USE

The mineral owner's right to reasonable use of the surface for
development and production of the minerals exists without
any express words of grant and is due in part to the
impossibility of reaching the minerals in any other manner.

LEASEHOLD INTEREST
A rka n sa s L e a se F orm (P a id -U p )
Rev, (0 60 5 ) with Option

OIL AND GAS LEASE
(Five Y e a r P a id - U p L e a se w ith O p tio n )

This agreement made and entered, into o n _____________________________ by and between________ ,_________________________________________
. __ , whose address is ____________________________________________, hereinafter called Lessor

(whether one or more) and________________________ ______________________ , hereinafter called Lessee.

W IT N E S S E T H : Lessor for and in consideration of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration in hand paid, receipt
o f which is hereby acknowledged, and o f the agreements o f Lessee hereinafter set forth, hereby grants, demises, leases and lets exclusively unto said Lessee h e
lands hereinafter described for the purpose of prospecting, exploring by geophysical and other methods, drilling mining, operating for and producing oil or
gas, Or both, including, but not as a limitation, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, gas-condensate (distillate) and any substance, whether similar or
dissimilar, produced in a liquid, or gaseous state, together with, the right to construct and maintain pipelines, telephone and electric lines, tanks, power stations,
ponds, roadways, plants, equipment and structures theron to produce, save and take care of said oil and gas and all other substances, and the exclusive right to
inject air, gas, water, brine and other fluids from any source into the subsurface strata and any and all other rights and privileges necessary, incident to, o r
convenient for the economical operation of said land, alone or conjointly with neighboring land, for the production, saving and taking care o f oil and gas and
all other substances and the injection o f air, gas, water, brine and other fluids into the subsurface strata, said lands being situated in the County o f___________,
Slate of Arkansas, and being described as follows to-wit:

Mineral Estate Dominance Over Surface Estate

Dominance of the mineral estate over the surface is a crucial
legal concept for the mineral owner and lessee because
ownership of subsurface minerals without the right to use the
surface for exploration and production would be practically
worthless. Stated another way, it is an absolute necessity for
the mineral owner to use the surface in order to enjoy his estate.

EARLY PATCHWORK OF CASES

Koury v. Morgan, 172 Ark. 405, 288 S.W. 929 (1926)

Express Easement in Oil & Gas Lease: “to mine and operate for oil
and gas, to lay pipe lines and build tanks, towers, stations, and
structures on the land for the purpose of producing saving, and taking
care of oil and gas products.”

Koury v. Morgan, 172 Ark. 405, 288 S.W. 929 (1926)
From Texas, the Court quoted Grimes v. Goodman Drilling C o .,216 S. W. 202,
204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919):
As appellant purchased the premises burdened with the terms of the lease, he is in no
position to complain of conditions produced by appellees, such as are usual and
customary during the drilling of an oil well.

The Court also quoted Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 74 W. Va. 107, 81 S.
E. 966, 967 (1914):
The principle is well established that injury necessarily inflicted in the exercise of a
lawful right does not constitute liability. The injury must be the direct result of the
commission of a wrong. * * * If defendant did no wrong, it is not liable,
notwithstanding the injury.

Koury v. Morgan, 172 Ark. 405, 288 S.W. 929 (1926)
“Interesting Discussion” 6 Thompson on Real
Property, p. 282, §5136:
As against the surface owner, the owner o f the minerals has a right,
without any express words o f grant for that purpose, to go upon the
surface to drill wells to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of
the surface beyond the limits o f his well or wells as may be necessary to
operate his estate and to remove the product thereof. This is a right to be
exercised with due regard to the rights o f the owner o f the surface, but,
subject to this limitation, it is a right growing out o f the contract o f sale,
the position o f the stratum sold, and the impossibility o f reaching it in
any other manner. * * * It is a well-settled principle that injury
necessarily inflicted in the exercise o f a lawful right does not create a
liability. The injury must be the direct result o f the commission o f a
wrong.

Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428 (1929)

Lessor/Lessee Dispute where OGL contained no express easement - implied
easement for ingress and egress. The Court relied on “settled” easement by
necessity principles:
“If one sells to another a tract of land surrounded by other land of the grantor,
a right of way across such other land is a necessity to the enjoyment of the
land granted, and is implied from the grant made.”

Wood v. Hay, 206 Ark. 892, 175 S.W.2d 189 (1943)

“The right to enter and to make reasonable use of the land in achieving in a
workmanlike way the only result the parties could have intended (if, in fact,
oil and gas in place, as distinguished from the right to lease, were retained)
must be implied from the nature of the matters dealt with. Thornton, The Law
o f Oil and Gas, vol. 1, § 342, states the better rule to be that in case of either
a reservation or an exception, a grantor has the right to enter on the surface
with all usual necessary appliances, and to remove the mineral without any
express authority reserved to that effect. In case of a reservation of minerals,
such property descends to the grantor’s heirs.”

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood,
240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966)
Reasonably Necessary
Free water clause - “Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas and water from
said land, except water from Lessor’s wells, for all operations hereunder.”
Surface use - “The lease further provided for reasonable use of the land in
drilling operations.”
“It is true that an oil and gas lease gives with it the right to possession of the
surface to the extent reasonably necessary to enable a lessee to perform the
obligations imposed upon him by the lease. This includes the right to enter
upon the premises and use so much of it, and in such manner, as may be
reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of the lease and effectuate its
purpose.”

CORRELATIVE RIGHTS /
REASONABLE USAGE EMERGES

Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips,
256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974)

“This case involves the correlative rights o f the owners o f the
surface estate and the separate owner o f the minerals.”
- Justice Brown

Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips,
256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974)
General Rule
Respective Rights of the mineral owner and surface owner
“As against the surface owner, the owner of the minerals has a right, without
any express words of grant for that purpose, to go upon the surface to drill
wells to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of the surface beyond
the limits of his well or wells as may be necessary to operate his estate and to
remove the product thereof. * * * It is a well-settled principle that injury
necessarily inflicted in the exercise of a lawful right does not create a liability.
The injury must be the direct result of the commission of a wrong.”
• 10 Thompson on Real Property § 5561 (1940); Koury v. Morgan

Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips,
256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974)
1. “An injury to the surface may be said to be the result of the commission of
a wrong when the use of the surface is unreasonable.”
2. When exercising the right of ingress and egress, the driller has a “duty to
do so in the manner least injurious to his grantor.”
3. The “rules of reasonable usage of the surface” as set out in Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Sup.Ct.Tex.1971) are highly persuasive.
“‘[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the established
practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the lessee whereby
the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface
may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.’”
4. “If the acts (of the lessee) complained of are found not to constitute a
reasonable use of the surface, the lessee is liable for the injury done.”

Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
281 Ark. 377, 664 S.W.2d 456 (1984)

“The appellees’ lease grants to appellees the express right to construct such
roads as are necessary to drill for gas on appellant’s lands and also provides
that if the well site is within the same drilling unit as is appellant’s surface
estate, the well will be considered as upon appellant’s land. Since the well is
within the drilling unit, the appellees have an express right to cross
appellant’s surface estate and can be liable only for unreasonable use.”

McFarland v. Taylor,
76 Ark. App. 343, 65 S.W.3d (2002)
“We are not prepared to hold that, as a matter of law, a mineral owner is
always entitled to choose between two or more means of access to the
minerals, without regard to necessity or to the harm it may cause the surface
owner, if the surface owner’s use did not predate the mineral owner’s use.
The respective rights of mineral and surface owners are well settled. The
owner of the minerals has an implied right to go upon the surface to drill
wells to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of the surface beyond
the limits of his well as may be necessary to operate his estate and to remove
its products. His use of the surface, however, must be reasonable. The rights
implied in favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised with due regard for
the rights of the surface owner. In Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d
428 (1929), the Arkansas Supreme Court made it clear that, in all
circumstances, the mineral owner’s use must be necessary and the potential
harm to the surface owner must be considered . . . .”

El Paso Production Company v. Blanchard,
371 Ark. 634, 269 S.W.3d 362 (2008)

The Blanchard case arose from seismic operations conducted by the
lessee o f a one-half severed mineral interest owner in Blanchard’s
property. Blanchard sued for trespass, among several other legal
theories, after the seismic results were less than exciting. Regarding
the trespass claim the Arkansas Supreme Court applied its prior
decisions holding that the mineral estate is dominant over the surface
estate, and that the mineral owner is entitled to reasonably necessary
surface usage to explore and develop the mineral estate.

DeSoto Gathering Company, LLC v. Smallwood,
2010 Ark. 5, 362 S.W.3d 298 (2010)
“The non-mineral lease from the Chandlers to Appellee occurred prior to any
severance of the surface and mineral estates; however, by its specific terms,
the lease restricted Appellant’s use of the ten acres for purposes of a singlefamily residence. Appellee therefore obtained a restricted-use leasehold
interest in the surface. Since the lease was for a restricted surface use, and not
a conveyance of the minerals, it operated as a severance of the mineral estate
owned by the Chandlers from the leasehold surface estate acquired by
Appellee under her residential lease. See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Wimberly, 181 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Civ.App.1944). As the restricted-use surface
lessee, Appellee took her leasehold as a servient estate subject to the burden
of a right of way or easement in favor of the dominant mineral estate,
allowing the use of so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for the
development and production of the minerals.”

Pollard v. SEECO, Inc.,
2013 Ark. App. 331, 427 S.W.3d 776 (2013)
“Controversy arose when appellees declined appellants’ requests to
construct the drill pad in another location. Generally, as against the
surface owner, the owner of mineral rights has a right to go upon the
surface to drill wells to his underlying estate and to occupy so much
of the surface beyond the limits of his well that may be necessary to
operate his estate and remove the product. An injury to the surface of
the land by the owner o f minerals may be said to be the result o f the
commission o f a wrong when the use o f the surface is unreasonable.
An injury necessarily inflicted in the exercise o f a lawful right does
not create a liability, and a lessee will only be liable to the surface
owner for damages when the lessee’s use o f the surface is
unreasonable. Here, appellees established that their use o f the surface
was reasonable, preventing any recovery at law for injury under the
oil and gas lease.”

Lessee’s Implied Duty to Restore the Surface:
Bonds v. Sanchez-O’B rien Oil and Gas Co.,

289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W.2d 444 (1986)

“The duty to restore the surface, as nearly as practicable, to the same
condition as it was before drilling is implied in the lease agreement.”
“To hold otherwise would allow the lessee to continue to occupy the surface,
without change, after the lease has ended. This would constitute an
unreasonable use, and no rule is more firmly established in oil and gas law
than the rule that the lessee is limited to a use of the surface which is
reasonable.”
The implied duty to restore the surface “runs with the lease.” Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co., 356 Ark. 324, 151 S.W.3d 306
(2004).

Special Exception to the Rule:
Complete Destruction of the Surface

Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 839 (1958). In
the exceptional case where the mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface
completely destroys other surface uses, he may be liable to the surface owner
even if the destructive use is reasonably necessary. U.S. Manganese Corp.,
the severed mineral estate owner had the right to conduct open pit mining for
manganese and could not be enjoined. But because open pit mining resulted
in complete destruction of the surface estate, leaving “the surface owner with
nothing but a ‘hole in the ground’ for his agricultural pursuits,” the surface
owner was entitled to damages for complete destruction of the surface.

Mineral Owner’s / Lessor’s Rights of Surface Use

1. The mineral owner or lessee has an implied right to occupy
and use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to
remove and produce the minerals.
2. The mineral owner or lessee, absent a contractual agreement
otherwise, is not liable to the surface owner for surface
damages unless the surface use by the mineral owner / lessee
is unreasonable (or negligent, or has exceeded the reasonably
necessary use of the surface).

Limitations on Mineral Owner’s / Lessor’s
Rights of Surface Use
3. The mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface must be
reasonable (or “reasonably necessary”).
4. The mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface must be
exercised with due regard for the rights and uses of the
surface owner.
5. In the exceptional case where the mineral owner’s or lessee’s
use of the surface completely destroys other surface uses, he
may be liable to the surface owner even if the destructive use
is reasonably necessary.
6 . Implied in every oil and gas lease is the duty to restore the

surface (upon termination of surface operations), as nearly as
practicable, to the same condition as it was before drilling.
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